Sujet: Adoption/Diffusion

Ce papier dresse un portrait clair de l’adoption et de la diffusion d’une innovation dans le secteur publique. Pour ce faire, l’auteur examine la diffusion et l’adoption d’une innovation TI parmi les corps policiers provinciaux de la Hollande. Pour le CDG, le cadre conceptuel proposé est pertinent.

Défintions
adoption of an innovation: « Second, the adoption of an innovation can be defined as “the [voluntary and/or coercive] process through which [an organization] passes from first knowledge of an innovation, to forming an attitude towards the innovation, to a decision to adopt or reject, to implementation of the new idea, and to confirmation of this
decision” [16, p. 20]. Organizations can adopt an innovation in varying degrees, ranging from copying an innovation without making any changes, to using an innovation as an inspiration [5, p. 52–53]. »
constructivist approach: « according to the constructivist (or cultural) approach, adoption decisions are not so much based on ‘economical fitness’, but on ‘social fitness’ or considerations of legitimacy, symbolism and fashion. An organization’s adoption decision is primarily based on a “logic of appropriateness”: organizations have identities and/or fulfil roles by recognizing situations and following rules which match appropriate behaviour to the situations they encounter [10, p. viii]. »
diffusion of an innovation: « First, the diffusion of an innovation can be defined as “a process in which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system” [16, p. 5]. It is important to make a distinction between the diffusion and the dissemination of an innovation. Whereas diffusion refers to the informal and “uncontrolled” spread of an innovation, dissemination refers to formally and centrally driven spread [8, p. 191–192]. »
functional meaning: « The functional meaning of an e-government innovation is (primarily) based on the logic of consequence and refers to the importance of the (perceived) characteristics of an innovation [3,7,16]. A distinction can be made between six – empirically interrelated but conceptually distinct – characteristics [16, pp. 16–17]:
relative advantage (degree to which an innovation is perceived as better than the idea it supersedes – in economic terms, but also in terms of social prestige), compatibility (degree to which an innovation is perceived as being consistent with existing values, norms, needs and past experiences), complexity (degree to which an innovation is perceived as difficult to understand and use), trialability (degree to which an innovation may be experimented with on a limited basis), observability (degree to which the results of an innovation are visible to others) and reinvention (degree to which an innovation can be changed or modified by a user in the process of adoption and implementation). »
functionalist approach « According to the functionalist approach – which is dominant in the models discussed above – adoption decisions are (primarily) driven by functional imperatives of efficiency. An organization’s adoption decision is primarily based on a “logic of consequence”: the assumption that organizations make choices among alternatives by evaluating their consequences in terms of prior preferences [10, p. vii]. »

goodness of fit: « This process of sense making is focused on the creation of a match between an innovation and a potential adopter, a so-called “goodness of fit” [4,11]. As indicated above, this fit can be understood both in terms of the “logic of consequence” and the “logic of appropriateness”. »
institutional meaning:    « The institutional meaning of an e-government innovation is (primarily) based on the logic of appropriateness and refers to the notion of “isomorphism”. Isomorphism is “a constraining process, that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions” [4,p. 66]. »
political meaning: « The political meaning of an e-government innovation is (primarily) based on the logic of appropriateness and refers to the opportunity structure an innovation can provide. »

Sujet: Diffusion/Adoption

Ce papier analyse 57 projets d’investissement de solutions TI dans 6 hopitaux. L’analyse révèle 7  archétypes de gourvernance des TI. Il s’agit de 7 façons ou chemins différents afin d’en arriver à une décision d’adoption. Pour le CDG, ceci donne des exemples réels de différents chemins qui mène à une décision d’adoption d’une innovation dans le secteur publique.

Définitions
it investment: « In this study, an IT investment is defined as a hospital’s allocation of financial and/or human capital on a specific informa-tion system. »
it function power: « The extent to which the IT department can influence other organizational units. IT function power was measured by (1) the IT manager’s hierarchical distance from top management; (2) the IT manager’s and staff’s self-perception of power; (3) the role of IT in the hospital strategy; and (4) the administrative personnel’s and medical professionals’ perceptions of the IT department’s influence (Appendix C). »
it governance: « A path consisting of three organizational actors who played the leading role in the three stages of an IT investment decision. The lead actors can be of four types: top management (TM), IT professionals (ITP),
administrative group (AG), and healthcare professionals (HCP). »
it investment characteristics: « An investment’s organizational level (departmental, interdepartmental, enterprise, or interorganizational), functional scope, and business
impact. »
external influence: The overall influence imposed by the external environment on the firm. An aggregate measure is used to capture the influence of competitive pressures, institutional pressures, or available resources.
centralization: The extent to which decision rights are concentrated at the top. Based on interviews and hospital organizational charts, the degree of centrali- zation of each hospital was determined (Appendix B).

Normes
« The resultant IT governance archetypes
identified in this study were emergent in the hospitals, rather
than predefined. The hospitals were unaware of the variety of
IT governance archetypes being used. If an a priori under-
standing of the IT governance archetypes is achieved,
appropriate measures can be taken to assess the variety of
decision processes used for IT investments, to adjust IT
governance patterns to prevent ill-advised IT investments, and
to design effective IT governance for future decision pro-
cesses. As Weill and Ross (2005) suggest, effective IT
governance can limit the negative impact of organizational
politics in IT-related decisions and improve organizational
performance. »
« First, when there are strong external influences, top management
monarchy seems to be appropriate for high level IT invest-
ments and administration/professional monarchy appropriate
for low level IT investments. »
« The advantage of using monarchies is that the organization can
quickly catch opportunities or fix problems, leading to short-
term success. The disadvantage is that without inputs from
the IT department, the information systems resulting from the
quick decisions may cause long-term problems such as the
lack of system integration. »
« Second, given that IT professionals seek to share or reuse
existing IT resources among business units and to standardize
the organizational IT architecture (Weill 2004), their involve-
ment in IT governance usually incorporates IT-related
information and analysis into the decision process, thus
enhancing procedural rationality of decision making (Dean
and Sharfman 1996). Hence, for business-oriented IT
investments, top management–IT duopoly, administration–IT
duopoly, and professional–IT duopoly should be practiced. »
« Business managers, therefore, should
initiate the proposal to specify their business needs and IT
professionals should develop the best IT solutions to fulfill
those needs. The disadvantage of these duopolies is that
conflicts are likely to occur and conflict resolution may slow
down the decision process. »
« Finally, IT monarchy is appropriate for decisions on IT
infrastructure that is not highly related with specific business
needs. This archetype may not be appropriate for business-
oriented IT investments because excessive governance by IT
professionals may lead to biased decisions. For example, it is
possible that an IT investment governed by IT monarchy is
not well aligned with the business needs due to the lack of
business-oriented inputs. »

Factoids
« Voici les 7 chemins pré-adoption et leurs descriptions:

Les états analysés sont: initation – developpement – proposition

Actors can be of four types: top management (TM), IT professionals (ITP), the administrative
group (AG), and healthcare professionals (HCP). To identify

1 – Top Management Monarchy: The TM–TM–TM path is named as top management monarchy because top management controls every stage of the decision-making process.

2 – Top Management–IT Duopoly: The top management–IT duopoly archetype represents the TM–ITP–TM decision path, in which top management initiates the investment project and IT professionals develop the proposal.

3 – IT Monarchy: The ITP–ITP–TM decision path is called IT monarchy, suggesting that IT professionals initiate and develop proposals with top management making the final decision.

4 – Administration Monarchy: The administration monarchy archetype represents an AG–AG–TM decision path.

5 – Administration–IT Duopoly: The administration–IT duopoly governance archetype denotes an AG–ITP–TM decision path, indicating that the investment proposal is initiated by administrative department managers, developed by IT professionals, and approved by top management.

6 – Professional Monarchy: The professional monarchy archetype depicts the HCP–HCP–TM decision path, where healthcare professionals initiate and develop IT investment proposals.

7 – Professional–IT Duopoly: We use professional–IT duopoly to describe the HCP–ITP–TM decision path. »
As the five propositions demonstrate, no IT governance archetype can be sufficiently predicted by a single factor.

Sujet: Impartition

Ce papier examine la progression du phénomène d’impartition des TI au sein du gouvernement et appel à la prudence et à une meilleur évaluation des besoins avant de systématiquement aller en impartition. Ceci peut être utile pour le CDG lors de l’évaluation des possibilités d’impartition.

Définitions
contract state: « In the public sector, the contract state can refer to contracting between public service organizations and their users/members of the public; contracting with external providers; or contracting between different parts of the public service. »

Normes
« Following Cordella’s (2007)
argument, only when the use of ICT to support the bureaucratic
function or other reforms in the internal organization of bureaucratic
activities continue to fail to support the bureaucratic organization is
where there is space to re-think the nature of the services and the
media channels through which they are delivered. In such cases, the
use of market-oriented mechanisms such as outsourcing, are possible
solutions. »
« Our paper points to a less than thoughtful move to ICT market-
ization and outsourcing throughout central government departments
throughout the 1990–2009 period and calls for a more disciplined
approach to outsourcing, that can in fact be learned from private and
public sector experiences alike. A key part of this is rebuilding internal
ICT skills in terms of ICT policy development and management
capability, the latter translating into the ability to elicit and deliver on
business requirements, manage external supply, achieve governance,
and keep control of the ICT blueprint and of IT destiny. »
« We conclude, therefore, that a reconsideration of the value of
bureaucracy, a rebalancing of outsourcing and in-house sourcing, and
a reassessment how flexible ICTs could be deployed, would seem to be
a useful counterweight to the rhetoric of progress, modernization,
transformative ICTs, and new public management that has shaped the
public debate over the last 20 years. »

Factoids
« In fact, it relies upon the assumption that the
bureaucratic organization has to be preserved as long as it is able to
provide coordination better than alternative organizational struc-
tures, such as market-like organizations. »

Sujet: Impartition

Définitions
general accountability:    « refers to accountability for general policy or overall performance »
particular accountability: « is restricted to accountability for particular decisions. »

Factoids
« The disagreement, which has simmered along for almost a decade, shows no
sign of resolution. The critics still point out, with apparently incontrovertible logic
and evidence, that some aspects of accountability are definitely reduced under
outsourcing (Mulgan 2003, ch 5; Barrett 2004). »
« Another relevant distinction is between various stages of accountability, in
particular three stages of information, discussion and rectification (Mulgan 2003, 30).
The meaning of these stages is fairly self-evident. Information refers to the obligation
on the part of the person or organisation being held to account to answer questions
and report about their activities. Discussion involves the further obligation to enter
into a dialogue of explanation and justification in response to scrutiny. Rectification is
the final stage set in motion when mistakes are made and includes the obligation to
impose remedies and sanctions where necessary. »
« Critics havesometimes expressed the fear that once governments devolve responsibility forservices to a separate organisation, governments will be able to engage in buck-
passing and blame-shifting (eg Mulgan 1997, Funnell 2001, Hood 2002). When
things go wrong, it is feared, the fact that service delivery is now in the hands of a
contractor rather than the government will entitle ministers and government officials
to refer any public anger over poor performance to the contractor. »
« By claiming to retain accountability, governments
undertake to accept the same degree of political risk as before and not to pass the buck. »
« In the new environment of mixed public and private delivery of
public functions, governments are aiming to choose the most efficient and effective
means of delivery, whether through public agencies or through private contractors,
depending on the circumstances of the individual case. Whatever structure is adopted,
however, governments are still expected to retain ultimate accountability for all
service provision. »
« As demonstrated, a claim of unaltered accountability in relation to
outsourced service provision is not strictly accurate, because some aspects of
accountability are inevitably reduced through the use of private contractors.
But governments must still accept collective liability for praise or blame even though they
have surrendered some mechanisms for maintaining control of the outcomes. »

« Personal responsibility for departmental actions is typically dispersed among the various members of the department, though they act within overall direction imposed from above.
In contractual relationships, on the other hand, particularly for complex and politically
sensitive services, government influence is pervasive among the staff of the
contracting organisation even if the organisation that employs them is legally separate
from government. »
« Outsourcing may weaken
some aspects of public accountability, especially over inputs and processes. But
government accountability for results brings increased control over private
organisations who contract to provide public services. »
« Beginning with general accountability, in relation to these three stages, can
ministers and officials (i) provide the same level of information, (ii) enter into the
same degree of public discussion and explanation, and (iii) impose the same remedies
and sanctions in relation to the overall performance of contractors as they could if the
service were provided by officials in their own departments? The answer depends, to
a certain extent, on the nature of the contract itself. »

Sujet: Impartition

Ce papier présente un cadre conceptuel sur l’impartition qui divise la discipline en 4 dimensions. Les rôles du managers sont abordés mais ceux de l’organisation en général y sont davantage analysé. Pour le CDG, ceci peut être un bon outils de validation lorsqu’une possibilité d’impartition se présente.

Définitions
relation-specific assets:    « defined as investments in assets that are specialized to the
interorganizational relationship. »
knowledge-sharing routines: defined as interfirm processes that facilitate the exchange of knowledge between the partners complementarities     »refers to the ability of firms to leverage their partners’ complementary resources – resources that
collectively generate greater rents than the sum of those obtained from their individual use »
effective governance:    « concerns the enforcement mechanisms of the
relationship because these mechanisms influence transaction costs and the motivation to engage in rent-generating initiatives »
it outsourcing: « refer to an organization’s decision to turn over the
management of part or all of its IT resources and activities to one or more external IT providers (e.g., Altinkemer et al., 1994; Cheon et al., 1995; Hall and Liedtka, 2005; Hu et al., 1997; Willcocks and Kern, 1998). »
outsourcing effectiveness: « I define outsourcing effectiveness as the degree to which the predefined strategic objectives of outsourcing are realized. »
relational assets: « I define relational assets as firm assets that are acquired to serve a particular interorganizational relationship. »
relational capabilities: I define relational capabilities as repeatable patterns of actions in the use of relational assets

Normes
« Basically, the main task facing the organization is deciding on
the arrangement that would best serve its IT needs, given the IT resources available to it.
Therefore, the key attributes at this point are those that are pertinent to the comparison between needed and available IT resources. The needed IT resources are primarily contingent upon the strategic role of IT in the organization, defined as the importance of IT for the implementation of the business strategy and the attainment of business goals. »
« The framework clearly conveys the message that it is the gestalt of attributes, rather
than any single attribute by itself, that determines the effectiveness of outsourcing relationships. Managers seeking to identify the attributes relevant for outsourcing-related decisions should therefore take an inclusive approach. They should consider the organizational attributes that relate to the outsourcing decision as well as the relational attributes that relate to its implementation. In addition, they should consider attributes that relate to strategic issues as well as attributes that relate to economic and social issues. However, managers’ approach should be inclusive not only in the sense of considering a larger number of attributes, but also in the sense of considering how the attributes are interrelated. »

Factoid
« This finding implies that the strategic level of IT needs is negatively associated with the degree of outsourcing. »

Sujet: Diffusion/Adoption

Ce papier décortique les innovation en 3 catégories et examine quels facteurs inluencent ces différents types d’innovation dans le secteur publique. Pour le CDG, le type d’innovation appelé  »ancillary » est intéressant car il s’agit des innovation de type inter-agences.

Définitions
innovation diffusion:   « Innovation diffusion is concerned with the diffusion of innovation through a population of potential adopter organizations over time and/or space
(Wolfe 1994). »
innovation: « The concept of innovation is complex – a process through which new ideas, objects and practices are created, developed or reinvented and which are new and novel to the unit of adoption (Aiken and Hage 1971; Kimberly and Evanisko 1981; Rogers 1995; Walker et al. 2002). »
ancillary innovation: « Ancillary innovations are identified by Damanpour (1987) and are differentiated from process and product innovation because of their reliance on relationships with other organizations and actors. »

Normes
« The role of leaders in organizations is important. In public organizations such as local authorities, which are democratically elected, the role of politicians is likely to be extremely influential in the adoption of innovations. Politicians will set political values and policy direction as well as allocate resources to a programme. Given that the majority of public officials in local authorities are permanent employees, they too are likely to influence the
management of an organization and play a role in establishing culture and motivating staff (Gould-Williams 2004). »
« Consequently, policy-makers, if seeking to encourage public organizations to innovate, need complex policy »
« tools that ensure that appropriate determinants of innovation adoption are in place. For example, if partnership is a form of innovation policymakers would like to see, they need to understand the ways in which the wider environment is likely to affect the behaviour of organizations. These prescriptions equally apply to managers – their role in developing innovations is to be able to read and interpret the external environment, organization
and diffusion factors and understand how different drivers may result in the requirements of different types of innovation. »

Factoids
« Three types of innovation are identified in the literature: product, process
and ancillary. »
« The distinction between product and process innovation originated in Schumpeter ’s work – a product being a new good or quality of a good and process a new method of production (Archibugi et al. 1994). »
« What distinguishes an ancillary innovation from product and process innovation is that the successful adoption of ancillary innovations is dependent on factors outside an organization’s control. Ancillary innovations are concerned with working across boundaries with other service providers, users or other public agencies and thus their successful implementation is reliant upon others. Ancillary innovations illustrate the overlapping nature of these concepts: a new service (product innovation) could be developed in partnership with other actors, including users or other public, voluntary or private organizations; alternatively, new governance arrangements (process innovations) could be put in place for a public organization that involves partner or user agencies undertaking joint decision making. »
« Environmental variables influenced the adoption ancillary: partnership, organizational and technological: market orientation innovations. Organizational variables predicted the adoption of new product, technological: ITC and organizational while diffusion variables assisted in explaining variance in all the innovation type models bar organizational innovations. »

Sujet: Impartition

Ce papier présent les 7 grandes catégories de risques dont il faut tenir compte lors d’un projet d’impartition ainsi que des stratégies pour bien les gérer. Pour le CDG, ceci est pertinent pour la définition des rôles et responsabilités lors d’une impartition. (L’essentiel du papier de retrouve dans les tableaux)

Définitions

oppotunism: « Opportunism is often defined as «  »self-interest seeking with guile »" leading to shirking, lying and other unethical behavior on the part ofthe agent or the principal (5, 8. 34). »
asset specificity: « The degree to which an asset can be redeployed without sacrificing its productive value if the contract is to be interrupted or prematurely terminated.
Because the «  »next best use »" value of a specific asset is much lower, the investor would lose part of its investment if the transaction was not completed. This
creates a lock-in situation where the other party (not investing) could extract an advantage from the investor by threatening to withdraw from the
transaction (5). »
performance metrics: « Define expectations in the contract. Metrics establish
what is expected and what happens if expectations are not met. Use metrics that support business goals. If cost-effectiveness is a major decision driver, include
contract provisions to encourage the vendor to reduce costs for the agency. Contracts can also use incentives to encourage vendors to surpass performance requirements. Cost increases due to the addition of other services from the vendor are avoided if
expectations are defined so the scope of work is clear (47, p. 22). »

Sujet: Impartition

Ce papier examine les roles des bureacrates et des vendeur TI lors d’impartion propre au secteur publique. L’auteur présente 4 types de relations qui émergent en fonction des connaissances du domaine d’expertise du partie opposé. Il en ressort que de plus en plus, les entreprises en TI s’approprient davantage de pouvoir politique car les bureacrates ont de la difficulté à suivre le developpement technologique ainsi que sa complexité. Pour le CDG, la présentation des 4 type de ralelation est pertinente car chaque projet est différent.

Définitions
outsourcing:   « Outsourcing is a management strategy that farms out non-core organizational activities to vendors who specialize in these activities in order to execute them more efficiently, reliably and economically. »
it outsourcing: « IT outsourcing typically includes the management and operation of computer facilities, the maintenance of information networks, the development of computer infrastructure and applications, and the training and support of employees. »
outsourcing:    « I therefore define outsourcing as the evolution of complex technological and political relationships between bureaucrat and vendor after the two are formally joined together to produce a new IT product. In my definition, vendors can assume an important leadership role by co-opting bureaucratic bystanders to support their project, securing financing for it, and building technology in order to accomplish a particular organizational outcome. Bureaucrats can play a critical technological role by influencing the project’s technical decisions. »
muddle through model: « The Muddle Through model joins a bureaucrat who does not master technology with a vendor who knows virtually nothing about his client organization. »
political contest model: « In the Political Contest model, the vendor assumes leadership by manipulating his technical expertise and knowledge of the organization’s politics. »
technological competition model: « In the Technological Competition model, the bureaucrat assumes leadership through his knowledge of the organization and technical expertise. »
power game model: « Finally, in the Power Game model, I join a technically proficient bureaucrat with an insider vendor. If the two cooperate well, they can overcome great bureaucratic opposition and deploy innovative IT products that re-engineer the organization’s daily work routines. »

Factoids
 » One study found that organizations with revenues between $500 million and $3 billion already outsource between 23% and 30% of their IT functionality and plan to outsource over 50% of their IT needs by the year 2,000. »
« Bureaucrat and vendor cooperate – or compete – with each other in every
political, organizational, and technological dimension of the project. »
« Bureaucrats possess extensive administrative and managerial backgrounds, are motivated by the desire to move up the bureaucratic ladder, remain loyal to their organization and are subject to the public code of ethics. Typically, they engage the project as one of many administrative chores and refer to their managers for advice and guidance. They also view themselves as guardians of the broader public interest and are subject to harsh public criticism if they do not behave accordingly [60, p. 99]. »
« IT vendors have extensive technological training and experience and are motivated by the desire to maximize profit and acquire new technical skills. They are neither loyal to their client public organization nor do they share values with it. They engage the project on a short-term contractual basis that defines their obligations and compensation. They revere – and consider themselves part of – the new nomadic global class of high tech
mercenaries who move rapidly between lucrative contractual assignments. They seek to serve the more profitable segments of society and pay little attention to the social consequences of their actions. Indeed, sometimes bureaucrats behave like “entrepreneurial heroes” and vendors behave like bureaucrats [9]. »
« The political reality of the public IT projects is even more complex than the technology. Sometimes, the vendor works as an insider while the Ministry’s MIS shop competes with vendors for a piece of the project. Frequently, complex bureaucrat-vendor hierarchies emerge. For example, an external consultant might manage bureaucrats who, in turn, supervise the work of other vendors. The project’s technological know-how is distributed among its participants. Each bureaucrat and vendor possesses the means to
shelter its core technology from other project participants and will share it for an ownership stake in the project [12, p. 91]. »
« These cases also reveal how vendors exert great influence over the project’s agenda
while working as insiders (Jerusalem’s Automation Company). »
« Frequently, IT outsourcing is portrayed as a game of risks and rewards. The bureaucrat assumes the risk of, and responsibility for, letting vendors take over IT functions. In return, the bureaucrat is rewarded with cheaper to maintain, more reliable, and effective IT systems and time to focus on the core activities he or she knows how to do well. »
« Nonetheless, IT projects are becoming more complex and bureaucrats cannot be expected to keep up with technological developments. Under such

conditions, vendors will exert an increasing amount of political influence over public IT projects in the future. If bureaucrats do not adjust to this new environment, we may end up with ever more spectacular
public IT failures. »

Sujet: Impartition

Ce papier explique de façon claire les structures de rôles et responsabilités lorsqu’une organisation veut impartir ses services TI. Pour le CDG ce texte est très pertinent car il explique qui est responsable de quoi lors d’une impartition.

Définitions
relatedness: « The described risk factor is termed relatedness, sometimes called interdependence and refers to the interconnections between tasks, business units or
functions. »
retained organization: « The main responsibility of the retained organization is to continually align the business units, which are in fact the customers of the retained
organization, and service provider expectations and furthermore to manage the service provider relationship on a daily basis in order to ensure that the outsourcing engagement delivers the expected value to the business. »
governance of it outsourcing:    « According to these researchers, the governance of IT outsourcing relationships is about realizing the mutually defined set of outsourcing goals which requires an actively managed partnership. »

Normes
« In order to manage the outsourcing partnership and to mitigate the inherent risk the customer in conjunction with the service provider needs to establish a governance model. »
« To manage the alignment between business and IT departments within the organization a clear management structure with roles, responsibilities, decision structures and appropriate process between both parties have to be in place. »
« A governance model between the outsourcing company and an external service provider has to address the following general governance questions (adapted from [11]):

• How does the outsourcer get his service provider
to return the expected business value to him?
• How can the outsourcer ensure that the service
provider does not waste the capital they supply or
invest in bad projects? »
« The role of the retained organization becomes more focused on strategic planning, (project) portfolio management, project management, management of IT architecture,
contract management and relationship management [10]. The retained organization is now responsible for managing the demand rather than the supply of IT services. »
« A governance model between the parties has to reflect the new responsibilities appropriately. According to Feeny and Willcocks [9] four core IT categories must kept in-house even if the customer wants to outsource nearly all of the IT. These core capabilities are IT governance, business requirements, technical ability and external service provider management.
Furthermore, the retained organization must have business and IT knowledge in order to fulfill their responsibilities [5]. In order to cope with these requirements, several new roles have to be established within the retained organization. The core roles of a
retained organization are:

- Head of retained organization

- Finance / Administration Manager

- Contract Manager

- Business Unit Manager

- IT Architect

- Service Level Manager »
« In order to set up the governance model it is necessary to clearly define the key responsibilities from strategic to operational level. The appropriate allocation of responsibilities between the partners is crucial for the delivery of the expected value within the outsourcing engagement. »

Factoids
« According to recent studies the average size of the retained organization is between five and seven percent of the former IT organization [20]. »

« A governance model provides an overarching structure which helps to support the business objectives of the customer on strategic, functional and operational level. The governance model defines «  »what to do »", «  »how to do it »", «  »who should do it »" and «  »how it should be measured »". It addresses the rules, processes, metrics and organizational structures needed for effective planning, decision making, steering and control of the outsourcing engagement in order to mitigate the risk inherent in any outsourcing relationship. »
« The organizational structure comprises roles, functions and the necessary reporting and decision structure in the new organization. The organizational structure also clearly defines the responsibilities for dedicated topics on outsourcer and service provider
side. There will be proprietary responsibilities for certain topics on each side and also joint responsibilities. »
« The success of the overall outsourcing transaction will considerably depend on how well both parties are capable of covering the required roles, establishing joint structures and building up joint processes at both ends of the two organizations. Therefore, the «  »right
team »" at the «  »right levels »" in the respective organizations will be the cornerstone for building strong, long-term relationships at all levels. »
« Critical to the success of the mentioned structures and processes is an effective communication among all parties based on a collaborative relationship.
Relationship management is an integral part of each governance model. A recent study [8] has shown that more than 50% of the alliances fail due to relationship
issues and not because of bad contracts or financial issues. »

Sujet: Impartition

Ce papier tente de savoir si l’impartition des services du gouvernement réduit vraiment les coûts de ce dernier. Il présente également deux éléments clés dont le gouvernement doit se pré-occupé lors d’une impartition, soient les mécanismes d’incitation et le transfère du risque.

Définitions
privatization : « The decision to transfer asset ownership from public to private hands is defined here as privatization. »
outsourcing : « The transfer of service provision from the public to an external organization (which is typically in the private sector but may also be an in-house team) is defined here as public sector outsourcing. »
hold-up: « This phenomenon – which involves appropriation of economic rent from the government – is referred to in the literature as ‘hold-up’. »

Norme
« Rather than relying on traditional competition or ownership explanations of
efficiency, the analysis presented here suggests that contract design will play an
important role in determining the success of future public sector outsourcing
arrangements. In deciding whether to make or buy public services, policymakers
need to consider a complex set of interacting factors such as the existence of
multiple agents and principals, incomplete contracts and the effects of high-
powered incentives on intrinsic motivation. »

Factoids
« The principal attempts to design a contract that
allocates risk to the agent in an efficient manner, while providing appropriate
incentives for performance. »
« On balance, the empirical evidence presented here suggests that outsourcing does
generate reductions in government expenditure. But there a couple of important
caveats to this conclusion. The first is that there is some evidence indicating that the
quality of service may suffer in certain circumstances as a result of outsourcing and
that workers may be worse off (at least in terms of their real wage). The second is
that the savings may be transitory – although the empirical evidence is thin, there is
some evidence to suggest that hold-up is a problem in outsourcing contracts. »
« Despite its importance as a public policy issue and the amount of research

devoted to it, the determinants of successful public sector outsourcing are still largely unknown. »
« In particular, new evidence is
emerging which suggests that intrinsic motivation may play an important role
in determining the efficiency of contractual relationships. »
« First, incentives play
an important role in the analysis, because transferring production from the public to
the private sector involves a shift in the fundamental incentive structures faced by
employees within organizations. »
« Second, risk is an important factor to consider, because uncertainty is a feature of most
production environments and outsourcing necessitates consideration of how this risk
will be allocated between the parties. While it is well established in the theoretical
literature that transferring risk to an agent involves a trade-off with incentives, this
insight has rarely been applied to the analysis of public sector outsourcing. »