Ci-dessous des commentaires relatifs à des facteurs de succès (suivi du premier auteur / année). À mettre à jour au fil des lectures.
Three integrative conditions for coordinated activity: accountability, predictability, and common understanding (Okhuysen 2009)
Four types of Collaboration (for innovation – Pisano & Verganti 2008):
Elite circles
Innovation malls
Innovation communities
Consortia
Can be distinguished by mode of governance (hierarchical or flat) and participation (open or closed). Hierarchical when you know to define and evaluate.
–
trust seems fundamental
psychological (shared values, legitimacy, perceived status)
–
cooperation can be critical for complex transactions that require substantial interaction or can be irrelevant or even costly when transactions are modular (Makadok & Coff 2009)
Cites Kerr (1975): goals in areas where quantification is difficult often go unspecified. The organization therefore often is in a position where it hopes for employee effort in the areas of team building, interpersonal relations, creativity, etc. but it formally rewards none of these (1975:775)
–
Kerr refers to Barnard: “a person can and will accept a communication as authoritative only when… at the time of his decision, he believes it to be compatible with his personal interests as a whole.” (Barnard, CJ (1964) The Functions of the Executive, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA)
–
You can improve collaboration until you’ve addressed the issue of conflict (Weiss & Hughes 2005)
Initial Conditions
- General Environment
Six theoretical perspectives (that) may be used to examine and explain collaborative behaviour:
- Resource dependence,
- Corporate social performance / institutional economics,
- Strategic management / social ecology,
- Microeconomics,
- Institutional / negociated order,
- And political. P140 (Wood & Gray, 1991)
Lax and Sebenius (1986) [...] identify three types of interests:
- Shared: Shared interests are interests held in common by stakeholders.
- Differing: Differing interests are self-interests based on differential valuations that do not interfere with one another. P.161
- And opposing: Opposing interests are self-interests that directly interfere with one another. (cité par Wood & Gray, 1991)
Oliver (1990) reviewed the literature on inter-organizational relationships and distilled her findings into six determinants:
- Necessity: Organizations collaborate because they have to in order to meet legal or regulatory requirements or because scarce resources, as predicted by resource dependence theory, dictate that they must join forces to survive.
- Asymmetry: Often powerful organizations will assert their power or influence over weaker organizations to attain control over resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
- Reciprocity: Organizations join together because they have mutually beneficial goals and interests.
- Efficiency: This is a primary tenet of transaction cost theory.
- To achieve stability, predictability, and dependability.
- For enhancing legitimacy. (cité par Mary K. Foster and Agnes G. Meinhard, 2002)
Different types of collaborative context:
- One type of collaborative context or “inter organizational innovation” identified by Mandell and Steelman (2003) is intermittent coordination, which occurs when the policies and procedures of two or more organizations are mutually adjusted to accomplish an objective.
- A second type of collaborative context is a temporary task force, which is established to work on a specific and limited purpose and disbands when that purpose is accomplished.
- A third type of collaborative context, according to Mandell and Steelman, is permanent or regular coordination. Such coordination occurs when multiple organizations agree to engage in a limited activity in order to achieve a specific purpose or purposes through a formal arrangement. (Cité par Michael McGuire, 2006)
Human and Provan (2000) found that three necessary and distinct dimensions are critical for networks:
- (1) The legitimacy of the network as a form that can attract internal and external support and resources;
- (2) The legitimacy of the network as an entity that is recognizable to both insiders and outsiders; and
- (3) The legitimacy of the network as an interaction that builds trust among members to freely communicate within the network. (cité par John M . Bryson, Barbara C . Crosby and Melissa Middleton Stone, 2006)
Donahue (2004) suggests three general criteria by which to judge the success of cross-sector collaborations:
(1) Simply existing,
(2) Meeting the organizational imperatives of the partners,
(3) And outperforming feasible alternative arrangements for creating public value. (cité par John M . Bryson, Barbara C . Crosby and Melissa Middleton Stone, 2006)
“The four major dimensions that shape the existence and functioning of a CoP :
(1) The organisational dimension, concerning relationship and roles within the CoP and between the CoP and the rest of the organization;
(2) The cognitive dimension, regarding the specific knowledge domain and the kind of practice the CoP deals with;
(3) The economic dimension, i.e. benefits, costs, and economic performance; and
(4) The technological dimension, concerning the role of enabling technologies”. (Enrico Scarso and Ettore Bolisani, 2007)
The potential value of collaboration: Specialization can create potential gains from integration, and therefore greater potential value to collaboration: Gains from integration may arise from
a) Effective utilization of shared infrastructure (i.e. cost synergies from spreading fixed costs over multiple units)
b) Ensuring interoperability (eg. design for manufacturing)
c) Scheduling activities (eg. in new product development)
d) Sharing best practices between units.
These can cover both “cost synergies” as well as “revenue synergies”. (Tobias Kretschmer and Phanish Puranam)
- Turbulence
When the forces resisting collaboration are equal to or stronger than the forces driving collaboration, a company is frozen (Dent and Goldberg 1999). It’s essential to unfreeze (external disruption, loss of competitiveness, etc.) the organization before collaboration can increase.
During the movement phase the driving forces and resisting forces collide, pushing the firm toward:
- A failed attempt to move from status quo practice
- A successful attempt to establish a collaborative SC culture
- Move to a status nor originally considered
Then companies need to refreeze or settle into a new equilibrium state after a period of change. (cité par Stanley E. Fawcett, Gregory M. Magnan and Matthew W. McCarter, 2008)
- Competitive and institutional elements
Networks and other types of intermunicipal collaboration is the result of specific actions taken to support the smaller municipalities and help them overcome three critical hurdles:
- The impossibility of achieving economies of scale in the launch of innovation processes,
- The lack of adequate professional skills,
- And the shortage of financial resources. (cité par Enrico Ferro and Maddalena Sorrentino, 2009)
When transaction costs are low cooperative action emerges (Heckathorn & Maser, 1987). Three types of transaction costs associated with establishing a joint venture. :
- Coordination problems resulting from information asymmetries,
- Negotiation costs from dividing mutual gains and required inputs,
- And the costs associated with enforcing and monitoring the agreement (Feiock, 2007; Maser, 1985). (cité par Christopher V. Hawkins, 2010)
- Direct Antecedents
Three critical issues of collaboration:
- The preconditions that make collaboration possible and motivate stakeholders to participate,
- The process through which collaboration occurs,
- And the outcomes of the collaboration. P140 (Wood & Gray, 1991)
5 dimensions clés :
- Governance : trouver le moyen de convenir ensemble des règles qui vont régir la prise des décisions collectives ;
- Administration : mettre en place la structure administrative permettant de passer de la gouvernance à l’action ;
- Organizational autonomy : problème inhérent à la collaboration = tension née de la volonté de satisfaire à la fois les intérêts et demandes de l’organisme “parent” et ceux de l’organisme avec lequel on collabore. Le réflexe le plus fréquent est d’aller demander validation à l’organisme parent avant toute action / décision, ce qui mène à la “collaborative inertia”. Souvent, c’est la collaboration qui est lésée. C’est d’autant plus dur de la défendre qu’il existe pas ou peu de hiérarchie dans la collaboration et que cette dernière se base sur le principe de la bonne volonté à il faut capter le maximum de dynamisme auprès des participants grâce à la 4ème dimension : mutuality.
- Mutuality : peut provenir de l’interdépendance (chaque partie a besoin de ce que l’autre possède) et d’intérêts convergents comme divergents, mais ” Thomson (1999) found that commitment to similar target populations proved to be one of the most important factors holding collaborations together”
- Norms (of reciprocity and trust) : généralement, logique de “I will if you will”, on fait quelque chose dans l’attente que l’autre partie en fasse autant. Avec le temps et les actions, chaque partie peut faire la preuve de sa bonne conduite et cette logique disparaît pour laisser le champ à la confiance et à l’action conjointe, mais cela prend du temps, aussi il faut établir des accords et contrats légaux avant de pouvoir compter sur les contrats psychologiques. (Ann Marie Thomson, James L. Perry and Theodore K. Miller, 2007)
It turned out that the key actors had planned their future cooperation to some extent a long time before the network was formed. […] The literature on regional and industrial districts stresses how pre-existing social relations among individuals in a region foster and support the development of more formal business relationships among organizations. (Arja Lemmetyinen, 2009)
A major challenge in developing cooperation among the different stakeholders in the network is that it requires the convergence and execution of interactions with the available resources, meaning that the stakeholders must have knowledge of the resources and be able to handle and combine them (Go & Williams, 1993; Knoke & Kuklinski, 1991; Riege & Perry, 2000). Such resources include social, technical and material structures (Cunha, Cunha & Kamoche, 1999; Go & van Fenema, 2003), to which the latter added mental structures or spaces:
(1) Social structures incorporate culture, leadership, motivation, group and individual dynamics, and behavior;
(2) Technical structures incorporate the hierarchy, the division of labor, rules and procedures;
(3) Material structures represent a general category in that they incorporate all the resources that lie beyond the individual and the organizational system. Examples of material structures include information systems, financial resources, buildings and other tangible assets, and the physical attractions at a tourist destination; and
(4) Mental structures or spaces represent the perceived destination image, which is relevant because “image making is power making” in the network society (Castells, 1996). (cité par Arja Lemmetyinen, 2009)
Carr and Wilinson (2005) describe boundary organizations as forums “where multiple perspectives participate and multiple knowledge systems converge.”
Cash et al. (2006) explain that whether as formal organizations specifically charged to play such intermediary roles, or as organizations that have “broader roles and responsibilities,” these boundary organizations have several important characteristics and institutional functions that enable boundary work:
(1) Accountability to both sides of the boundary;
(2) The use of “boundary objects” such as maps, reports, and forecasts that are co-produced by actors on different sides of the boundary;
(3) Participation across the boundary;
(4) Convening;
(5) Translation;
(6) Coordination and complementary expertise; and
(7) Mediation. (cité par Ricardo S. Morse, 2010)
Contingencies and Constraints
- Type of collaborations
Collaboration between organizations has been considered from a number of different perspectives. One approach stems from the notion of ‘collective’ strategy where businesses cooperate rather than compete (e.g. Astley, 1984; Bresser, 1988; Bresser and Harl, 1986; Carney, 1987).
Such collaboration takes a variety of forms:
- Joint ventures (Harrigan, 1985),
- Strategic partners (Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller, 1995),
- Alliances (Kanter, 1990),
- Networks (Alter and Hage, 1993; Powell, 1990; Thorelli, 1986),
- Network alliances (Gomes-Casseres, 1994),
- Modular corporations (Tully, 1993),
- Outsourcing (Winkleman, 1993)
- And virtual corporations (Byrne, 1993). (cité par Nelson Phillips, Thomas B. Lawrence and Cynthia Hardy, 2000)
Structure and Governance
Institutionalized rules and resources are used in the negotiation of at least three aspects of the collaborative process:
- The definition of the issue or problem that the collaboration is intended to address;
- The membership of the collaboration;
- And the practices utilized in response to the problem. (Nelson Phillips, Thomas B. Lawrence and Cynthia Hardy, 2000)
- Structural Configuration
Agranoff (2003) demonstrates that four different types of networks can be delineated:
- Informational networks involve multiple stakeholders who come together for the sole purposes of exchanging information and exploring solutions to a problem or set of problems. Any action that is taken occurs within the member agencies’ home organizations.
- Developmental networks involve information exchange combined with education that enhances the member organizations’ ability to implement solutions, again at the individual organization level rather than at the network level.
- Outreach networks not only exchange information and improve the administrative capacity of the network members but also “carve out programming strategies for clients (for example, funding packages, usable technologies) that are carried out elsewhere, usually by the partner organizations” (11). Although action strategies are developed in the network, action does not occur at the network level.
- The most extensive type of network is known as an action network. Unlike the other three types, action networks engage in collective action by formally adopting network-level courses of action and often delivering services. (cité par Michael McGuire, 2006)
Currently, there are three system architectures for network coordination in commercial software packages and research projects:
- (1) Centralised coordination system with local data access (e.g. SAP’s R/3),
- (2) Hybrid coordination system with some distributed local functionality and a central co-ordination module (e.g. SAP’s advanced planner and optimiser (APO), European project X-CITTIC (Rupp and Ristic, 2000)), and
- (3) Fully decentralised coordination system without central co-ordination (e.g. i2’s Tradematrix Open Commerce Network (OCN), European project PRODNET II (Camarinha-matos et al., 1998)) (cité par Henry Xu, Lenny Koh and David Parker,2009)
In the completely decentralised model, each company in the supply network has its own local planning system, which performs local planning for the company while connecting through a unit coordination module to other network members. Clearly, this decentralised system architecture has two important privileges over the other two in terms of network coordination:
- (1) To the highest extent, it maintains the local decision autonomy of individual companies in the supply network as there is no central optimisation for the total network (Anussornnitisarn et al., 2005; Hulsmann et al., 2008), and
- (2) It supports heterogeneity of their existing local planning systems, particularly ERP systems for large companies and other forms of local planning systems for SMEs (e.g. PC-based applications). Therefore, it was considered to be most suitable for manufacturing co- ordination in global supply networks. (cité par Henry Xu, Lenny Koh and David Parker,2009)
The major common features for most industries’ supply networks have structural and organisational requirements, which must be met by network coordination systems.
Particularly, (1) the system architecture must be compatible with the heterogeneous and distributed industrial environment in terms of different local legacy systems and geographically separated manufacturing locations,
(2) The system needs to be scalable and quickly re-configurable to cater for the growth and changes of the network structure, and
(3) The system should provide decision-support information especially in unexpected or exceptional situations. (cité par Henry Xu, Lenny Koh and David Parker,2009)
- Governance Structure
In addition to social mechanisms, the choice among types of governance structure is likely to influence network effectiveness (Provan and Kenis 2005):
(1) Self-governing structures in which decision making occurs through regular meetings of members or through informal, frequent interactions;
(2) A lead organization that provides major decision-making and coordinating activities; and
(3) A network administrative organization, which is a separate organization formed to oversee network affairs. (cité par John M . Bryson, Barbara C . Crosby and Melissa Middleton Stone, 2006)
Process
Studies of successful collaborative projects in the for-profit sector identify eight main characteristics:
- Trust: the partners must trust each other to act in the interest of the project, not to increase their position at the expense of the other (Bergquist, Betwee, and Meuel, 1995; Child and Faulkner, 1998).
- Flexibility: the people who work on a project collaboratively have a high “tolerance for ambiguity,” because otherwise they would find the constantly changing roles, tasks, and problems frustrating (Goldman and Kahnweiler, 2000, p. 446).
- Understanding: This is referred to as “cultural fit,” in which different management systems, different ways of doing things, and different values are brought together harmoniously (Child and Faulkner, 1998, p. 33; Herzlinger, 1997).
- Balance of power: If partners remain in a collaborative project freely and are committed to its objectives, they will accomplish more with a nonhierarchical structure than with coercion or control (Lober, 1997; Collins, 1997).
- Shared mission: the partners have a shared mission or direction and are enthusiastic about the expected outcome of the project because it is important to each of them (Bailey and Koney, 2000; Child and Faulkner, 1998; Collins, 1997; Lober, 1997).
- Compatibility: Compatibility with the people who work for the other agency, whether through professional or social settings, may precede rather than follow the decision to work collaboratively (Bergquist, Betwee, and Meuel, 1995; Cook, 1987).
- Communication: This relates to trusting each other and not holding back with information that is relevant to the project.
- Commitment: Leaders may drive change and energize an organization, but they must also be willing to acknowledge that the staffers who work on a project regularly may know the situation better than they and allow staff to make decisions (Cohen and Tichy, 1997; Senge, 1997). (cité par Mary M. Shaw, 2003)
- Forging Agreements
Here, we present five different types of mechanisms that encapsulate how emergent practices assist in coordination:
- Plans and rules (Defining responsibility for tasks – Resource allocation – Developing agreement),
- Objects and representations (Direct information sharing – Scaffolding – Acknowledging and aligning work – Creating a common perspective),
- Roles (Monitoring and updating – Substitution – Creating a common perspective),
- Routines (Task completion/stability – Hand-off work – Bringing groups together – Creating a common perspective),
- And proximity (Visibility – Monitoring – Updating – Familiarity - Anticipating and responding – Store of knowledge – Developing trust). (cité par Gerardo A. Okhuysen and Beth A. Bechky, 2009)
- Building Leadership
Agranoff and McGuire distinguish collaborative management behaviours in terms of their operational differences and organize the behaviours into four different categories:
- Activation: is the identification and incorporation of the right people, and resources, who possess the policy-making resources – finances, knowledge, information, expertise, experience, legal authority, and labour on which the collaborative effort depends in order to attain its goals.
- Framing includes facilitating agreement on leadership and administrative roles; helping to establish an identity and culture for the network, even if it is temporary or continually changing; and helping to develop a working structure for the network (i.e., committee involvement, network assignments) ( McGuire 2002 ).
- Mobilizing,
- and Synthesizing. (Cité par Michael McGuire, 2006)
Two key leadership roles are:
- Sponsors (individuals who have considerable prestige, authority, and access to resources)
- And Champions (are people who focus intently on keeping the collaboration going and use process skills to help the collaboration accomplish its goals.) (Crosby and Bryson 2005a). (cité par John M . Bryson, Barbara C . Crosby and Melissa Middleton Stone, 2006)
Creative collaboration requires managers close the cultural, emotional, physical, and strategic gaps that are an artefact of modern organizational design and promote turf protection.
- Managers must consciously make the case for specific change
- They must navigate the difficult, dynamic and potentially lengthy transformation process
- They must promote a new “fluid” state that is responsive to a rapidly changing market. (Stanley E. Fawcett, Gregory M. Magnan and Matthew W. McCarter, 2008)
Outcomes and Accountabilities
- Outcomes
“Herman Bakvis and Grace Normes : Skogstad suggest three criteria to assess performance (2008: 4).
- The first looks at whether the governing arrangements are consistent with federal principles – that is, whether each order of government is autonomous within its sphere and whether there is an appropriate balance between unity and diversity.
- The second examines the degree to which federal institutions produce results in the form of agreements.
- The third looks at ‘‘workability’’ of the institutions and processes in question (both formal and informal) and their capacity to foster cooperation and collaboration, accommodate conflict, and resolve disputes that prevent the effective functioning of the system (Wood 2008; Dupré 1985)”. (cité par Donna Wood, Thomas R. Klassen, 2009)
Lesson 1: The network is not the only vehicle of collaborative management.
Lesson 2: Managers continue to do the bulk of their work within the hierarchy.
Lesson 3: Network involvement brings several advantages that keep busy administrators involved.
Lesson 4: Networks are different from organizations but not completely different.
Lesson 5: Not all networks make the types of policy and program adjustments ascribed to them in the literature.
Lesson 6: Collaborative decisions or agreements are the products of a particular type of mutual learning and adjustment.
Lesson 7: The most distinctive collaborative activity of all of the networks proved to be their work in public sector knowledge management.
Lesson 8: Despite the cooperative spirit and aura of accommodation in collaborative efforts, networks are not without conflicts and power issues.
Lesson 9: Networks have their collaborative costs, as well as their benefits.
Lesson 10: Networks alter the boundaries of the state only in the most marginal ways; they do not appear to be replacing public bureaucracies in any way. (Robert Agranoff, 2006)
- Accountabilities
Seven coordination processes
(1) Long-term business planning: aims to generate a reliable and feasible long-term plan for the network through feedback from upstream companies regarding the feasibility of capacity and early communication of changes.
(2) Operational ordering and planning: supports the short- and medium-term operational planning process by making orders and consumptions visible to the upstream companies and buffer levels and delivery schedules in the opposite direction. It also promotes the detection and resolution of planning problems early through feedback loops in the standard operational planning process.
(3) Request and feasibility study: assists medium-to long- term network planning through a fast check for capacity and material availability across the supply network when new orders or large order changes are expected.
(4) Exception handling: mainly focuses on dealing with short-term demand changes and short-to medium- term delivery problems through fast and effective negotiation processes.
(5) Multi-sourcing coordination: is actually a building block of business processes 1-4, which helps to optimise the allocation of work to different suppliers based on a set of criteria (e.g. capacity, price), business rules and fast negotiation processes.
(6) Visibility of order progress: closes information flow loops by feeding back order status information and providing early warning of delivery problems to the downstream companies.
(7) Network performance management: includes a common set of network performance indicators (e.g. forecast accuracy, delivery reliability), evaluation and analysis of these indicators and suggestions for improvement programs. (cité par Henry Xu, Lenny Koh and David Parker,2009)
Motivations
Ben-Ner and Putterman (1999), described individual behavior as driven by three different types of preferences: self-regarding, other-regarding, and process-regarding.
- Self-regarding preferences characterize homo oeconomicus and his self-seeking behavior. They concern the individual’s own consumption and other outcomes. (Economic, extrinsic (job security, working hours compatible with needs; and the working environment), and rational incentives)
- Other-regarding preferences exist when the individual also considers the welfare of others and is driven by motivations geared to collective or social aims ((decision making autonomy, variety and creativity of the work, professional growth, recognition of workers’ contribution)
- Process-regarding preferences concern the manner in which the individual in question and others behave, including the way in which they attain outcomes of interest. (cité par Carlo Borzaga and Ermanno Tortia, 2006)
—————————————————————————————————
Open Versus Closed Innovation: A Model Of Discovery And Divergence:
The trade-off between discovery and divergence determines the desirability of open versus closed innovation.
Extending The Understanding Of End User Information Systems Satisfaction Formation: An Equitable Needs Fulfillment Model Approach:
Higher levels of IS performance result in higher levels of EUS.
Higher levels of equitable work performance fulfillment result in higher levels of EUS.
Higher levels of equitable relatedness fulfillment result in higher levels of EUS.
Moving Beyond Intentions And Toward The Theory Of Trying: Effects Of Work Environment And Gender On Post-Adoption Information Technology Use:
Here, we have shown that by granting them control over the scheduling and manner in which they complete tasks, women can be encouraged to try to innovate with IT and subsequently identify solutions to obstacles with existing technologies.
Also, autonomy may ameliorate the effects of qualitative overload on men’s unskilled attempts to innovate with IT. If autonomy’s introduction also signals greater accountability, it may encourage men to direct their attempts to innovate down fruitful, rather than playful, paths. Identifying successful, emergent applications of IT could yield substantial savings and increase firm profitability (Nambisan et al. 2000).
For example, where trying to innovate is desirable, innovation can be encouraged by providing autonomy and minimizing overload. Alternately, if trying to innovate undermines task performance, autonomy can be restricted and employees’ interaction with IT can be directed to be more focused.
Influence Processes For Information Technology Acceptance: An Laboration Likelihood Model:
Drawing from ELM, this research presents two alternative modes of influence, namely the central and peripheral routes, which managers can employ to encourage organizational members’ acceptance of IT. The former technique involves educating users about the potential benefits of IT acceptance by providing them high-quality arguments about how the new IT can substantially improve their work, while the latter technique involves providing peripheral cues such as endorsements from reputable or preferred sources about the benefits and potential impacts of IT acceptance.
Second, IT managers should understand that a “one size fits all” approach to influence may not lead to the desired acceptance outcomes in organizations, given wide variation in organizational users’ motivation and ability to elaborate issue relevant arguments. Our study demonstrated that users who see high job relevance in IT usage and have relatively high IT expertise tend to follow the central route to influence and are influenced more by argument quality, while those with low perceptions of job relevance and expertise are more likely to rely on peripheral cues for their IT acceptance decisions.
Accordingly, IT managers should endeavor to assess users’ elaboration motivation and ability before deciding which influence strategy to pursue in their organizations and should consider segmenting users into different groups, based on their elaboration states before administering influence strategies.
Finally, which of the two influence processes is better for changing user perceptions over the short and long terms? Our findings suggest that both the central and peripheral routes of influence are viable ways of shaping user perceptions over the short-term. However, our limited examination of ELM’s temporal persistence hypotheses suggests the central route may be superior over the long-term because the perceptions created by this route are more stable over time and lead to persistent effects on long-term IT acceptance
It Innovation Adoption In The Government Sector: Identifying The Critical Success Factors:
Voici les 42 facteurs de succèes résumés dans 22 propositions:
P1. A high level of support from the administrative authorities can have a positive impact on IT innovation adoption in government organisations.
P2. A high level of financial support can have a positive impact on IT innovation adoption in government organisations.
P3. A high level of managerial capabilities and support from within the organisation can have a positive impact on IT innovation adoption in government organisations.
P4. A high level of effective management style can have a positive impact on IT innovation adoption in the government organisations.
P5. A high level of technological complexity can have a negative impact on IT innovation adoption in government organisations.
P6. A high level of organisational complexity can have a negative impact on IT innovation adoption in government organisations.
P7. A high level of technological compatibility can have a positive impact on IT innovation adoption in government organisations.
P8. Higher levels of organisational compatibility can have a positive impact IT innovation adoption in the government organisations.
P9. Higher levels of knowledge of the market environment can have a positive impact on IT innovation adoption in government organisations.
P10. A higher level of community size can have a positive impact on IT innovation adoption in government organisations.
P11. A higher organisational size can positively influence IT innovation adoption in government organisations.
P12. A higher level of coordination and communication can positively impact IT innovation adoption in government organisations.
P13. Higher levels of IT resources can positively impact IT innovation adoption in government organisations.
P14. Higher levels of personnel IT skills can positively impact IT innovation adoption in government organisations.
P15. Higher levels of IT sophistication can positively impact IT innovation adoption in government organisations.
P16. The existence of a champion at the organisational level can positively impact IT innovation adoption in government organisations.
P17. Higher levels of external forces/pressures can positively impact IT innovation adoption in government organisations.
P18. The existence of a government-wide policy and legal framework can positively impact IT innovation adoption in government organisations.
P19. Higher socio-economic status can positively impact IT innovation adoption in government organisations.
P20. A higher level of overall organisational participation in the planning and development process can positively impact IT innovation adoption in government organisations.
P21. A higher level of inter-organisational trust can positively impact IT innovation adoption in government organisations.
P22. A higher number of participants (and their identities) can positively impact IT innovation adoption in organisations.
Innovation Steps In The Diffusion Of E-Customs Solutions:
Facilitators of adoption:
(1) Benefit potential of the Public Sector.
(2) Procedural improvements and streamlined business processes.
(3) Avoidance of misinterpretations of standardized regulations.
(4) Standardization of processes, messages, and data models ease the development of ecustoms solutions.
Barriers to adoption:
(1) Slowdown in regulation execution due to missing procedural templates.
(2) Increased complexity in the standardization process itself confuses organizations.
(3) Electronifying operations will affect the role of individuals as well as organizations.
A Simulation-Based Approach To Understanding The Dynamics Of Innovation Implementation:
First, managers should not adopt an innovation unless they are prepared to be both fully committed to the effort and patient in the months between adopting the innovation and crossing the motivation threshold. A halfhearted approach or early termination can severely limit the value of an otherwise useful innovation. Managers may be understandably suspicious of the recommendation that, once they choose to adopt an innovation, they support it wholeheartedly irrespective of any reservations concerning lack of appropriateness. To do otherwise, however, insures that the implementation effort will fail.
A second and subtler implication is that managers interested in successful implementation should focus on achieving the motivation threshold, not the generation of early results at any cost. As highlighted earlier, all too often, initial implementation efforts are conducted under conditions that undercut their utility as vehicles for diffusing the innovation. Extra resources, personnel, and managerial attention often lead to success, but cause those viewing the effort from the outside to discount the observed results.
Third, in contrast to the conventional wisdom (e.g.,Kotter 1995, Schaffer and Thomson 1992), a focus on generating early results does not always contribute to long-term success. Rather than making it easier to improve other areas, a dramatic implementation success in one area can make subsequent attempts more difficult as success draws scarce resources away from other, lower performing areas. In this model, performance is better if the experts allocate their resources without regard to results. This does not imply that practitioners should ignore results when making resource allocation decisions, but only that any decision must be tempered with the knowledge that observed results are a function of both the appropriateness of the innovation to the context in question arid the current state of the reinforcement and diffusion processes.
Reconceptualizing Compatibility Beliefs In Technology Acceptance Research:
From the perspective of practice, since compatibility beliefs are instrumental in shaping beliefs about usefulness and ease of use, and they also influence usage directly, managers responsible for implementing new technologies need to pay careful attention to their formation. Positive beliefs about the compatibility of a new technology can be developed in many ways: by highlighting the similarities between workflow enabled by the technology and the individual’s current and preferred work styles, by underscoring how the technology embodies prevalent values, and by emphasizing the fit between the technology and the mental models created through prior experiences.
Expectation Disconfirmation And Technology Adoption: Polynomial Modeling And Response Surface Analysis:
This study helps practitioners in solving the initial acceptance and subsequent discontinuance anomaly. The findings here call for managers to set realistic expectations about a system in order to develop a more favorable chance of users continuing to use the system in the long run. They should always attempt to set and achieve high expectations because behavioral intention to continue using a system is higher when pre-exposure expectations of usefulness are high and met, compared to when expectations of usefulness are low and met. The findings here also allude to building systems with a simple but clear purpose as, because behavioral intention is quite high even if fairly low expectations are set and met, that may well be the case with a system, that may not possess extensive functionality but rather a focused set of features.
There is risk involved in overselling information systems. Managers often try to oversell their system during the training sessions, thus resulting in users developing unrealistically high expectations. We recommend that managers focus on the basic and essential features of the system so as to set realistic expectations and meet them. One popular adage is to “underpromise and overdeliver.” We strongly caution trainers and managers against following this popular adage so as to avoid the negative effects of positive disconfirmation.
A Configurational Approach To Information Technology Outsourcing:
Basically, the main task facing the organization is deciding on the arrangement that would best serve its IT needs, given the IT resources available to it. Therefore, the key attributes at this point are those that are pertinent to the comparison between needed and available IT resources. The needed IT resources are primarily contingent upon the strategic role of IT in the organization, defined as the importance of IT for the implementation of the business strategy and the attainment of business goals.
The framework clearly conveys the message that it is the gestalt of attributes, rather than any single attribute by itself, that determines the effectiveness of outsourcing relationships. Managers seeking to identify the attributes relevant for outsourcing-related decisions should therefore take an inclusive approach. They should consider the organizational attributes that relate to the outsourcing decision as well as the relational attributes that relate to its implementation. In addition, they should consider attributes that relate to strategic issues as well as attributes that relate to economic and social issues. However, managers’ approach should be inclusive not only in the sense of considering a larger number of attributes, but also in the sense of considering how the attributes are interrelated.
Outsourcing, Bureaucracy And Public Value: Reappraising The Notion Of The “Contract State”:
Following Cordella’s (2007) argument, only when the use of ICT to support the bureaucratic function or other reforms in the internal organization of bureaucratic activities continue to fail to support the bureaucratic organization is where there is space to re-think the nature of the services and the media channels through which they are delivered. In such cases, the use of market-oriented mechanisms such as outsourcing, are possible solutions.
Our paper points to a less than thoughtful move to ICT marketization and outsourcing throughout central government departments throughout the 1990–2009 period and calls for a more disciplined approach to outsourcing, that can in fact be learned from private and public sector experiences alike. A key part of this is rebuilding internal ICT skills in terms of ICT policy development and management capability, the latter translating into the ability to elicit and deliver on business requirements, manage external supply, achieve governance, and keep control of the ICT blueprint and of IT destiny.
We conclude, therefore, that a reconsideration of the value of bureaucracy, a rebalancing of outsourcing and in-house sourcing, and a reassessment how flexible ICTs could be deployed, would seem to be a useful counterweight to the rhetoric of progress, modernization, transformative ICTs, and new public management that has shaped the public debate over the last 20 years.
Incentives And The Efficiency Of Public Sector-Outsourcing Contracts:
Rather than relying on traditional competition or ownership explanations of efficiency, the analysis presented here suggests that contract design will play an important role in determining the success of future public sector outsourcing arrangements. In deciding whether to make or buy public services, policymakers need to consider a complex set of interacting factors such as the existence of multiple agents and principals, incomplete contracts and the effects of high-powered incentives on intrinsic motivation.
A Governance Model For Managing Outsourcing Partnerships:
In order to manage the outsourcing partnership and to mitigate the inherent risk the customer in conjunction with the service provider needs to establish a governance model.
To manage the alignment between business and IT departments within the organization a clear management structure with roles, responsibilities, decision structures and appropriate process between both parties have to be in place.
A governance model between the outsourcing company and an external service provider has to address the following general governance questions (adapted from [11]):
- How does the outsourcer get his service provider to return the expected business value to him?
- How can the outsourcer ensure that the service provider does not waste the capital they supply or invest in bad projects?
The role of the retained organization becomes more focused on strategic planning, (project) portfolio management, project management, management of IT architecture,
contract management and relationship management [10]. The retained organization is now responsible for managing the demand rather than the supply of IT services.
A governance model between the parties has to reflect the new responsibilities appropriately. According to Feeny and Willcocks [9] four core IT categories must kept in-house even if the customer wants to outsource nearly all of the IT. These core capabilities are IT governance, business requirements, technical ability and external service provider management: Furthermore, the retained organization must have business and IT knowledge in order to fulfill their responsibilities [5]. In order to cope with these requirements, several new roles have to be established within the retained organization. The core roles of a retained organization are:
- Head of retained organization
- Finance / Administration Manager
- Contract Manager
- Business Unit Manager
- IT Architect
- Service Level Manager
In order to set up the governance model it is necessary to clearly define the key responsibilities from strategic to operational level. The appropriate allocation of responsibilities between the partners is crucial for the delivery of the expected value within the outsourcing engagement.
Innovation Type And Diffusion: An Empirical Analysis Of Local Government:
The role of leaders in organizations is important. In public organizations such as local authorities, which are democratically elected, the role of politicians is likely to be extremely influential in the adoption of innovations. Politicians will set political values and policy direction as well as allocate resources to a programme. Given that the majority of public officials in local authorities are permanent employees, they too are likely to influence the management of an organization and play a role in establishing culture and motivating staff (Gould-Williams 2004).
Consequently, policy-makers, if seeking to encourage public organizations to innovate, need complex policy
Tools that ensure that appropriate determinants of innovation adoption are in place. For example, if partnership is a form of innovation policy-makers would like to see, they need to understand the ways in which the wider environment is likely to affect the behaviour of organizations. These prescriptions equally apply to managers – their role in developing innovations is to be able to read and interpret the external environment, organization and diffusion factors and understand how different drivers may result in the requirements of different types of innovation.
Assimilation Of Interorganizational Business Process Standards:
Our results indicated that high resource and routine rigidities coupled with a lack of relational and influence mechanisms were the inhibiting forces behind low adoption and deployment of IBPS. Industry leaders and standards-development consortia should identify ways to reduce routine and resource rigidities.
Managers should be aware that implementation of IBPS is resource intensive and may require substantial changes to existing work processes, structures, and linkages among the core activities of a firm.
Shared Leadership In Teams: An Investigation Of Antecedent Conditions And Performance:
Organizations can promote internal leadership by setting expectations and encouraging members when teams initially form to view themselves and their fellow team members as leaders and to engage in shared, mutual leadership.
Top Management Incentive Compensation And Knowledge Sharing In Multinational Corporations:
Sveiby (1997) and Hansen et al. (1999) discuss two distinct strategies for managing the knowledge assets within the company. The first one focuses on documenting and making explicit the experiential knowledge of people and processes by creating databases, manuals, etc. This strategy has been referred to as the ‘information rich’ (Sveiby, 1997) or ‘codification’ (Hansen et al., 1999) strategy. The second strategy focuses on the people aspects of knowledge: the experiences, the informal networks, collaboration, and culture. Within this strategy, creating written information is secondary to facilitating coming in contact with the people who have the knowledge required for a certain project or client assignment. This strategy has been referred to as the ‘knowledge rich’ (Sveiby, 1997) or ‘personalization’ strategy (Hansen et al.,1999).
Decoding Resistance To Change :
Here are five ways you can use resistance to effect change more productively:
1. Boost awareness (lors de l’évaluation des impacts d’un changement, se mettre dans les souliers de tous ceux affectés afin de bien comprendre toutes les répercussions pour chacun)
2. Return to purpose (s’assurer que tout le monde impliquer comprennent le pourquoi du changement ainsi que les bénéfices collectifs et individuels qui y sont reliés)
3. Change the change (Favoriser l’écoute des autres afin d’apporter des modifications jugés bénéfiques pour le projet de changement)
4. Build participation and engagement (Impliquer le plus possible tout les acteurs concernés afin qu’ils soient le plus près possible de l’action et qu’ils se sentent comme faisant parti du changement)
5. Complete de past (s’assurer de bien boucler les expériences précédentes qui aurait mal tournée afin de réduire au maximum leurs influences sur le présent projet)
When Teams Can’T Decide :
Stratégies et recommendations pour éviter le voting paradoxe:
- Articulate clearly what outcome you are seeking. (It’s essential to keep discussion of the desired outcome distinct from discussion about how to achieve it.)
- Test fences and walls. (essayer de savoir dès le départ les options qui posent problème dans la tête des gens)
- Provide a range of options for achieving outcomes.
- Surface preferences early. (Proposing options early and allowing people to tailor them reduces the likelihood that executives will be forced into a stalemate that the CEO has to break)
- State each option’s pros and cons.
- Devise new options that preserve the best features of existing ones.
- Deliberate confidentially.
- Deliberate over an appropriate time frame.
8 Ways To Build Collaborative Teams:
Eight Factors That Lead to Success:
1 – Investing in signature relationship practices: Executives can encourage collaborative behavior by making highly visible investments – in facilities with open floor plans to foster communication, for example – that demonstrate their commitment to collaboration.
2 – Modeling collaborative behavior: At companies where the senior executives demonstrate highly collaborative behavior themselves, teams collaborate well.
3 – Creating a gift culture: Mentoring and coaching – especially on an informal basis – help people build the networks they need to work across corporate boundaries.
4 – Ensuring the requisite skills: Human resources departments that teach employees how to build relationships, communicate well, and resolve conflicts creatively can have a major impact on team collaboration.
5 – Supporting a strong sense of community: When people feel a sense of community, they are more comfortable reaching out to others and more likely to share knowledge.
6 – Assigning team leaders that are both task and relationship-oriented: The debate has traditionally focused on whether a task or a relationship orientation creates better leadership, but in fact both are key to successfully leading a team. Typically, leaning more heavily on a task orientation at the outset of a project and shifting toward a relationship orientation once the work is in full swing works best.
7 – Building on heritage relationships: When too many team members are strangers, people may be reluctant to share knowledge. The best practice is to put at least a few people who know one another on the team.
8 – Understanding role clarity and task ambiguity: Cooperation increases when the roles of individual team members are sharply defined yet the team is given latitude on how to achieve the task.
Facteur de risques:
Large size team: How-ever, our research shows that as the size of the team increases beyond 20 members, the level of natural cooperation among members of the team decreases.
Virtual participation: Our research shows that as teams become more virtual, collaboration declines.
Diversity: However, our research shows that the higher the proportion of people who don’t know anyone else on the team and the greater the diversity, the less likely the team members are to share knowledge.
High education level: Again, however, our research shows that the greater the proportion of highly educated specialists on a team, the more likely the team is to disintegrate into unproductive conflicts.
In Pursuit Of Inter-Agency Collaroration In The Purlic Sector:
The moral for inter-agency collaboration is that rather than eschew or suppress conflict, the need is to explore ways in which conflict can be acknowledged, but nevertheless can be reconciled with collaborative activity — an issue examined in the next component of this framework.
As well as a mutual recognition of interdependence, it is also important to acknowledge areas of independetice — that is, those activities which organizations define as their specialist realm of practice and which they believe can be best undertaken on an intra agency basis. It is a point made by Hardy et al. (1992) when they emphasize the need for ‘sensitivity towards not only converging but diverging organisational and professional needs and interests’ (p. 20).
Bryson, however, suggests that if a whole series of small wins can be informed by a sense of strategic direction, they can add up to a big win over time – his notion of ‘think big and act small’. It is an argument which can usefully be applied to collaborative endeavour, where there is sometimes a tendency to think small and act small, or think small and act big.
The Relationship Between Organizational Cultureand The Deployment Of Systems Development Methodologies:
A strong hierarchical culture in itself may facilitate SDM deployment (Hypotheses H1 through H4), but a weak hierarchical culture will pose a considerable challenge for SDM introduction.
One option in this case is to emphasize SDM support for the dominant cultural orientation of the organization when introducing an SDM. For example, in an organization with a dominant developmental cultural orientation, one may emphasize support for creativity and adaptation to the external environment. If the SDM to be introduced does not support these directly, it may be deliberately engineered to include such features. A second option is to introduce an SDM as an effective means of making the less creative aspects of systems development work more orderly and routine, thus freeing systems developers’ time for more creative work.
Another point is that the adoption of an SDM may lead to a more hierarchical culture, since SDMs may be perceived as manifestations of such a culture. It is well-known from contingency theory that a hierarchical culture has drawbacks, especially in an uncertain and dynamic environment (Burns and Stalker 1961). If an organization does not wish to move in that direction, it should pay special attention to means of avoiding the hierarchical flavor of SDMs when introducing them. One possibility is to engineer a SDM that is less bureaucratic by introducing it as a general approach (Iivari et al. 1998) rather than as a complicated conglomerate of numerous techniques with massive documentation. A general approach that emphasizes goals, guiding principles, fundamental concepts, and principles of the design process may also make an SDM more useful, as concluded by Fitzgerald (1997, p. 207): “the multiplicity of manuals which accompany many methodologies and prescribe in a very detailed fashion the
exact manner in which development should take place is not suited to the actual needs of developers in practice.”
It is obvious that it is extremely difficult to demonstrate the contribution of SDMs to productivity and efficiency, and it may be for this reason that IT managers in organizations with a rationally oriented culture take a more critical attitude toward SDMs.One should obviously pay special attention to the introduction strategy in these rationally oriented organizations, and to therole of IT managers in this process. First, one should attempt to convince IT managers of the benefits of SDMs in terms of their impact on productivity, efficiency, and goal achieve- ment, especially in the longer run. This is not an easy task.A second option is to customize an SDM meticulously to fit the special needs of the adopting organization. One should be careful, however, when a project encounters a crisis to make sure that this is a question of conscious, deliberate local customization rather than simply of sloppy adherence to the SDM (Humphrey 1989). A third solution is to introduce changes incrementally (Tolvanen 1998) so that the complexity of the new methodology increment is reduced and its trialability and demonstrability increased. This can be expected to facilitate organizational learning with regard to the impact of SDMs and more rational decision-making concerning their adoption.
The Effects Of Conflict Asymmetry On Work Group And Individual Outcomes:
We suggest that a first step for managers and group leaders is to identify whether all group members are experiencing a given conflict equally, or whether members perceive the level of conflict differently.
When employees experience a conflict, they should ask themselves whether other team members also perceive a conflict. Research on perspective taking, for instance, suggests that employees who can put themselves in another’s shoes and imagine another’s point of view, or perspective, will be more successful in their interactions (Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001)
In addition, there are also lessons to be learned regarding conflict management strategies. One of the first things a manager may need to do when hearing about or perceiving a conflict in a work group is to deal with the perceiver. The manager may not necessarily need to validate the view of the conflict perceiver but should ensure that the individual reacts to her/his own conflict perspective in a positive fashion.
However, we also found that general group asymmetry (members perceiving different levels of conflict) does decrease overall group performance and creativity. This implies that conflict resolution strategies should include bringing conflicts into the open so that the “reality” can be agreed on and then dealt with. In fact, we found that it is better for all members to agree that there is a high level of conflict than to disagree about whether there is a conflict at all.
Both Market And Hierarchy:An Incentive-System Theory Of Hybrid Governance Forms:
Finally, our model may also have implications for practice. It can offer practitioners prescriptive guidelines about when they might change governance structures. In particular, our theory highlights the importance of considering cross-task synergies as a factor in choosing governance forms—a factor that has previously been largely omitted. While our formal model may seem abstract, the underlying motivational problem of leverless tasks is fundamental. Managers are aware of when tasks cannot be directly motivated, and the notion of designing governance structures to motivate them indirectly is not hard to convey. Managers would simply identify how tasks must be grouped, which ones can be directly motivated, and which ones can only be encouraged indirectly. In this way our theory may prove relatively easy to apply in an actual organizational context.
Managing Peer-To-Peer Conflicts In Disruptive Information Technology Innovations: The Case Of Software Reuse:
Successful disruptive innovations require management to examine the impact of architectural changes to work processes on the stakeholders involved. It is critical for management to understand the overall technical and business goals being sought, to understand how these goals are being interpreted by stakeholders and how they might induce conflicts within the work processes involved, to identify the critical interfaces between these work processes, and to devise effective tactics for resolving work process conflicts.
Successful disruptive IT innovations demand that a shared vision of an initiative’s nature and effects be developed by, communicated to, and accepted by all stakeholders. Such an “organizing vision” (Swanson and Ramiller 1997) must make clear the program’s short- and long-term benefits, costs, and risks. Most, if not all, stakeholders are likely to incur some short-term pain to reap the long-term benefits. In particular, managers must realize that short-term goal suboptimization is required to achieve long-term goal optimization. Establishing and then managing stakeholders’ expectations through the period of short-term pain is critical.
Successful disruptive IT innovations demand, at their core, active attention to organizational learning. By its nature, innovation involves experiencing and leaming about new things. With dismptive IT innovations, such leaming require- ments are significantly enhanced (Christensen 1997). As a consequence, resources and time must be invested in leaming activities, and the leaming that occurs must be captured, distributed, and, most importantly, fed back into the innovation initiative and its management.
Fighting Against Windmills: Strategic Information Systems And Organizational Deep Structures:
This paper focuses on the process of implementing strategic information systems (SIS) by studying the radical changes it may bring to an organization’s deep structure. It argues that a full understanding of the process of implementation of such systems should include not only technical aspects but also the social dynamics of an organization; specifically core values, distribution of power and mechanisms of control. A theore tical framework is formulated based on punctuated equilibrium and previous SIS literature, and is applied to an exploratory case study conducted in a Latin American public organization. The case study depicts how the initiative to implement SIS was the result of external and internal disturbances. The case analysis highlights relationships between an organization’s deep structure and SIS implementation. The paper concludes by discussing the theoretical and practical implications of the study. These include (1) the role of the formal organizational structure in influencing the outcome of SIS implementations, (2) the impact of exogenous contingencies such as elections and external funding that may create a sense of crisis and (3) the influence of newcomers who may be brought in to solve the crisis.
Performance Effects Of Information Technology Synergies In Multibusiness Firms:
It is critical for IT managers to implement all four dimensions of IT relatedness simultaneously, since performance effects are contingent on their coexistence and complementarity. The first dimension of IT relatedness—the use of common IT infrastructure technologies—captures IT synergies arising from tangible IT resources. The second, third, and fourth dimensions—coordinated IT strategies, pooled negotiation power, and shared know-how—capture IT synergies arising from intangible IT management expertise and know-how, as explained in more
detail below.
Want Collaboration?:
Stratégies pour résoudre le conflit lorsqu’il arrive:
Devise and implement a common method for resolving conflict.
Provide people with criteria for making trade-offs.
Use the escalation of conflict as an opportunity for coaching.
Stratégie pour résoudre le conflit lorsqu’il se déplace vers de haut dans la hiérarchie (un conlfit qui doit être réglé par la direction):
Establish and enforce a requirement of joint escalation. Let’s again consider the situation at Matrix.
Ensure that managers resolve escalated conflicts directly with their counterparts.
Make the process for escalated conflict resolution transparent.
Information Technology Governance In Information Technology Investment Decision Processes: The Impact Of Investment Characteristics, External Environment, And Internal Context:
The resultant IT governance archetypes identified in this study were emergent in the hospitals, rather than predefined. The hospitals were unaware of the variety of IT governance archetypes being used. If an a priori understanding of the IT governance archetypes is achieved, appropriate measures can be taken to assess the variety of decision processes used for IT investments, to adjust IT governance patterns to prevent ill-advised IT investments, and to design effective IT governance for future decision processes. As Weill and Ross (2005) suggest, effective IT governance can limit the negative impact of organizational politics in IT-related decisions and improve organizational performance.
First, when there are strong external influences, top management monarchy seems to be appropriate for high level IT investments and administration/professional monarchy appropriate
for low level IT investments.
The advantage of using monarchies is that the organization can quickly catch opportunities or fix problems, leading to short term success. The disadvantage is that without inputs from the IT department, the information systems resulting from the quick decisions may cause long-term problems such as the lack of system integration.
Information Technology Governance In Information Technology Investment Decision Processes: The Impact Of Investment Characteristics, External Environment, And Internal Context:
The advantage of using monarchies is that the organization can quickly catch opportunities or fix problems, leading to short-term success. The disadvantage is that without inputs from the IT department, the information systems resulting from the quick decisions may cause long-term problems such as the lack of system integration.
Second, given that IT professionals seek to share or reuse existing IT resources among business units and to standardize the organizational IT architecture (Weill 2004), their involvement in IT governance usually incorporates IT-related information and analysis into the decision process, thus enhancing procedural rationality of decision making (Dean and Sharfman 1996). Hence, for business-oriented IT investments, top management–IT duopoly, administration–IT duopoly, and professional–IT duopoly should be practiced.
Business managers, therefore, should initiate the proposal to specify their business needs and IT professionals should develop the best IT solutions to fulfill those needs. The disadvantage of these duopolies is that conflicts are likely to occur and conflict resolution may slow down the decision process.
Finally, IT monarchy is appropriate for decisions on IT infrastructure that is not highly related with specific business needs. This archetype may not be appropriate for business-
oriented IT investments because excessive governance by IT professionals may lead to biased decisions. For example, it is possible that an IT investment governed by IT monarchy is not well aligned with the business needs due to the lack of business-oriented inputs.
