Sujet: Impartition
Ce papier examine les roles des bureacrates et des vendeur TI lors d’impartion propre au secteur publique. L’auteur présente 4 types de relations qui émergent en fonction des connaissances du domaine d’expertise du partie opposé. Il en ressort que de plus en plus, les entreprises en TI s’approprient davantage de pouvoir politique car les bureacrates ont de la difficulté à suivre le developpement technologique ainsi que sa complexité. Pour le CDG, la présentation des 4 type de ralelation est pertinente car chaque projet est différent.
Définitions
outsourcing: “Outsourcing is a management strategy that farms out non-core organizational activities to vendors who specialize in these activities in order to execute them more efficiently, reliably and economically.”
it outsourcing: “IT outsourcing typically includes the management and operation of computer facilities, the maintenance of information networks, the development of computer infrastructure and applications, and the training and support of employees.”
outsourcing: “I therefore define outsourcing as the evolution of complex technological and political relationships between bureaucrat and vendor after the two are formally joined together to produce a new IT product. In my definition, vendors can assume an important leadership role by co-opting bureaucratic bystanders to support their project, securing financing for it, and building technology in order to accomplish a particular organizational outcome. Bureaucrats can play a critical technological role by influencing the project’s technical decisions.”
muddle through model: “The Muddle Through model joins a bureaucrat who does not master technology with a vendor who knows virtually nothing about his client organization.”
political contest model: “In the Political Contest model, the vendor assumes leadership by manipulating his technical expertise and knowledge of the organization’s politics.”
technological competition model: “In the Technological Competition model, the bureaucrat assumes leadership through his knowledge of the organization and technical expertise.”
power game model: “Finally, in the Power Game model, I join a technically proficient bureaucrat with an insider vendor. If the two cooperate well, they can overcome great bureaucratic opposition and deploy innovative IT products that re-engineer the organization’s daily work routines.”
Factoids
” One study found that organizations with revenues between $500 million and $3 billion already outsource between 23% and 30% of their IT functionality and plan to outsource over 50% of their IT needs by the year 2,000.”
“Bureaucrat and vendor cooperate – or compete – with each other in every
political, organizational, and technological dimension of the project.”
“Bureaucrats possess extensive administrative and managerial backgrounds, are motivated by the desire to move up the bureaucratic ladder, remain loyal to their organization and are subject to the public code of ethics. Typically, they engage the project as one of many administrative chores and refer to their managers for advice and guidance. They also view themselves as guardians of the broader public interest and are subject to harsh public criticism if they do not behave accordingly [60, p. 99].”
“IT vendors have extensive technological training and experience and are motivated by the desire to maximize profit and acquire new technical skills. They are neither loyal to their client public organization nor do they share values with it. They engage the project on a short-term contractual basis that defines their obligations and compensation. They revere – and consider themselves part of – the new nomadic global class of high tech
mercenaries who move rapidly between lucrative contractual assignments. They seek to serve the more profitable segments of society and pay little attention to the social consequences of their actions. Indeed, sometimes bureaucrats behave like “entrepreneurial heroes” and vendors behave like bureaucrats [9].”
“The political reality of the public IT projects is even more complex than the technology. Sometimes, the vendor works as an insider while the Ministry’s MIS shop competes with vendors for a piece of the project. Frequently, complex bureaucrat-vendor hierarchies emerge. For example, an external consultant might manage bureaucrats who, in turn, supervise the work of other vendors. The project’s technological know-how is distributed among its participants. Each bureaucrat and vendor possesses the means to
shelter its core technology from other project participants and will share it for an ownership stake in the project [12, p. 91].”
“These cases also reveal how vendors exert great influence over the project’s agenda
while working as insiders (Jerusalem’s Automation Company).”
“Frequently, IT outsourcing is portrayed as a game of risks and rewards. The bureaucrat assumes the risk of, and responsibility for, letting vendors take over IT functions. In return, the bureaucrat is rewarded with cheaper to maintain, more reliable, and effective IT systems and time to focus on the core activities he or she knows how to do well.”
“Nonetheless, IT projects are becoming more complex and bureaucrats cannot be expected to keep up with technological developments. Under such
conditions, vendors will exert an increasing amount of political influence over public IT projects in the future. If bureaucrats do not adjust to this new environment, we may end up with ever more spectacular
public IT failures.”
